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From the numerous themes present in a deep and inspiring book by Linda 
Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, I would like to address some problems 
related to the model of revelation (chap. 9, sec. 3.2, pp. 191-199).1 It is 
particularly important for theologians and followers of the religions, such 
as Judaism, Christianity and Islam, which ‘have in common a revelation 
from God at a time in the past’ (p. 192). Both theologians and ordinary 
believers want to understand the content of the revelation and guarantee 
its inviolable transmission through generations. A  philosopher of 
religion, however, asks whether it is at all possible for such a revelation 
to occur, and if so, how it is to be recognized and in what ways it may be 
accessible ‘to a great number of people over a very long period of time 
in widely varying circumstances’ (p. 191). Zagzebski discusses three out 
of a  variety of models of revelation conceived of as a  specific kind of 
communication between God and the human being (‘communication 
between God and me’ – p. 191). Using her key words, let us call them, 
respectively: the chain model, the experience model, and the high point 
(or the state of perfection) model.
I. ASSUMPTIONS
Before I  examine, in discussion with Linda Zagzebski, the mentioned 
models, I will reconstruct the assumptions that she accepted and that, 
consequently, affected her choice, presentation and evaluation of those 
models. (Zagzebski clearly sympathizes with the last one). In my opinion, 
1 If not indicated otherwise, all page numbers refer to the discussed book by Linda 
Trinkaus Zagzebski (2012).
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those assumptions  – and their equivalents presented and defended in 
various parts of her book – come down to the following:
The assumption of historicity: God’s revelation took place at 
a  definite moment or period in the history of humankind and is 
transmitted or updated in the times that follow it. (This assumption 
does not exclude the existence of non-historical revelation, but leaves 
it out of the scope of analysis.)
The assumption of communality: The recipient of revelation is 
a  member of a  definite community, of a  certain We, within which 
a revelation takes place and is transmitted.
The assumption of the indispensability of authority: No human 
being can acquire correct beliefs on divine matters, or lead a proper 
religious life, relying exclusively on herself, in a cognitive isolation (or 
independence) from beliefs and exemplars of life of the community 
that is a partner in a revelation.
The assumption of the test of conscientious judgment: The 
condition of a given person’s justified acceptance of a given religious 
community authority (as a partner or a bearer of a revelation) is the 
person’s conscientious judgment that if she engages in the beliefs 
and practices of this community – instead of forming them on her 
own – the chances that their result will survive her conscientious self-
reflection will increase.2
I  believe that a  good model of revelation should not only agree with 
the listed assumptions, but should also provide more specific criteria 
to recognize a  revelation and to correctly choose a  religious authority 
from competing candidates. As the author herself remarks, ‘cases of 
competing authorities’ (p.  111) and the fact ‘of disagreement between 
communities’ (p.  221), and especially between communal religious 
authorities, constitute one of the greatest challenges for epistemology 
(and especially for the epistemology of religion).
2 The first assumption appears clearly on pp. 190-192, the three others on pp. 199-
203. The assumption of communality seems a consequence of epistemic universalism, 
and the assumptions concerning authority are applications of the main argument of the 
book: in various areas of knowledge and life appear individuals or communities that 
are ‘in a better position to get the truth [or other valuable ends] than I’ (p. 111); if they 
pass the test of my conscientious self-reflection, ‘I should follow the[ir] authority in that 
case’ (p. 111).
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II. THE CHAIN MODEL
I believe that the chain model of revelation (CM) may be represented – 
in agreement with Zagzebski’s intentions (cf. pp.  193-194)  – as 
a trichotomous structure:
(CM1) initiating event: God enters (at a  definite historical time) 
in direct contact with the few chosen people (founders of religion, 
prophets, direct witnesses of divinity, etc.);
(CM2) multistage transmission: a  result of the initiating event (in 
the form of stories, a set of rules, mystical poetry, etc.) ‘is transmitted 
by oral or written testimony’ to other people  – first directly 
(eyewitnesses  – their listeners or firsthand recipients), and later 
indirectly (firsthand recipients – secondhand recipients, etc.);
(CM3) integrating intention: in God’s intention the initiating event 
(experience) contains important content that may be understood not 
only by an  eyewitness, but also by all its n-hand recipients; due to 
this fact, all the recipients (regardless of when and where they live) 
can constitute one community – the community which, thanks to the 
acts of collective memory, continually makes available or updates the 
universal content of the initiating event.3
It seems obvious that the presented model agrees with the assumptions 
of historicity, communality and indispensability of authority. The only 
problem might at most be the fact of the privileged position of the 
initiating event participants. We should remember, however, that in the 
history of religions it is difficult to find isolated initiated events whose 
participants are deprived of the authoritative context of their own 
community.4 For instance, Moses stood before God as a representative 
of his community with its tradition and mission for the future. The 
membership of this community enabled him to identify the Revealing 
One as the God of his fathers, and His commands as the commands 
3 Point (CM3) is necessary to answer questions like: ‘Why would it matter to us 
what a man called Abraham did, or that Moses had a religious experience in front of 
a burning bush if we are only the distant recipients of testimony about their contact with 
God?’ (p. 193)
4 We should rather speak of various types (conditioned by historical-communal 
contexts and connected to one another) of initiating events that differentiate the families 
of religions (e.g. the family of the Abrahamic religions), religions (e.g. Christianity), 
denominations (e.g. Methodism), and intra-confessional spiritual traditions (e.g. 
Franciscan spirituality in Catholicism).
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for the whole of Israel. Similar was the case of the Apostles who had 
initially interpreted the person of Jesus Christ in the context of the 
community of Israel, extending later its range under the influence of 
a new initiating event.
Let us assume the chain model and ask what more specific conditions 
must a given religious community, presumed to have been constituted 
by (CM1)-(CM3), meet to deserve a  positive epistemic evaluation 
(according to the principle of the conscientious judgment test). In other 
words: When are we allowed to regard a given community as a reliable 
bearer of God’s revelation or as a justified religious authority?
I believe that a person who attempts to judge the epistemic value of 
a given religious community should answer three questions:
(i) the question concerning (CM3): Does the community under 
evaluation proclaim contents comprehensible to its contemporaries 
and reveal universal truths about God and man?
(ii) the question concerning (CM2): Does the message transmitted 
by the community under evaluation accurately inform about the 
initiating event?
(iii) the question concerning (CM1): Has the initiating event 
(recounted in the message) actually been inspired by God?
I believe that a sympathetic interpretation of the contents pro claimed by 
the great world religions would allow an affirmative answer to the first 
question in almost all of the cases.5 In such a situation, the evaluation 
of a  given religious community would depend on the answers to the 
remaining questions.
As for the second question, the advocates of the community under 
evaluation might refer to the so-called Expansion of Trust Principle:
‘I have reason to trust those who are conscientiously trusted by those 
I conscientiously trust.’ (p. 97)
Indeed, in many religions their fundamental contents are transmitted on 
the basis of natural trust between numerous transmitters and recipients, 
conceived of as links in a multi-element chain. This trust is usually related 
to family ties: parents transmit their faith to children, the children to 
5 A less sympathetic or less open interpreter might judge that content from the vantage 
point of her prior (especially pre-religious) convictions concerning God, the world and 
values. Would such a person, however, need revelation, if she had known beforehand 
what exactly it should contain?
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their children, etc. Sometimes faith is acquired by people from outside 
these ties. This, however, is often related either to trust based on the 
emotion of admiration (cf. pp.  87-93), or to a  rational analysis of the 
presumed authority’s cognitive capacity. In each of these cases – as we 
can say, paraphrasing the Expansion of Authority Principles (p. 152) – 
a person may be justified in believing that she has the proper access to 
the content of the initiating event, because she is justified in believing 
that it is not her, but the community or certain of its representatives 
who may have knowledge on this matter, and this community or its 
representatives are justified in believing that it is not them, but the first 
witness or witnesses (related to them) who have such knowledge. The 
access to the contents of the initiating event (experience) would then be 
guaranteed by the whole community as a  chain of witnesses, initiated 
by the first witnesses. The links of this chain are bound together by the 
appropriate – most frequently based on trust or related emotions – acts 
of authority recognition.
Religious communities usually present themselves as faithful 
transmitters of the content of the initiating event. Their members have 
prima facie good reasons to believe in the message transmitted by their 
community. (Whom is the person born in this community to believe, if 
not her ancestors? And the one who joined the community basing on her 
own judgment – whom is she to believe, if not her ability to recognize 
authority?) The question arises, however, whether the community’s 
message on the initiating event is sufficient to accept the claim to its 
divine origin. In this way we approach the problem (CM1) – the first and 
most important element of the chain model.
An adherent of the affirmative answer to the above question reasons 
more or less in the following way:
If I accept the testimony (coming from the first witnesses) of a given 
religious community on the initiating event, I should also accept its 
interpretation of this event (coming, explicitly or implicitly, from the 
first witnesses), including the interpretation that points to its divine 
origin; since the competences of the community (greatly exceeding 
my own) concern not only testimony transmission, but also its 
interpretation.
Let us call this approach the internal approach (IA), as it occurs most 
frequently in those who reason, as it were, from inside of a  given 
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community. Their adversaries  – we will call them adherents of the 
external approach (EA) – might reason in the following way:
A  religious community (and its first witnesses) is capable only of 
the transmission of information on the initiating event, but not 
of its interpretation; in that case I am allowed to accept the divine 
origin of the event only if I reach the belief that a description of this 
event (provided by the community and the first witnesses) contains 
such elements that if I had been its direct participant, I would have 
accepted (immediately or on further reflection) on the basis of those 
elements that the event had been inspired by God.
(EA) is most frequently used in religious apologetics. Not only do 
apologists wish to present the self-understanding of a  given religious 
community, but, in the first place, they wish to present reasons that 
might induce a person from outside the community to accept its claims 
to divine origin. Among such reasons, Christian apologists give a special 
place to miracles. They usually claim that the trustworthy Christian 
message on the initiating events of Christianity includes information 
on miracles that confirm the divine origin of those events. For instance, 
Richard Swinburne (2008: 85-87) emphasizes that ‘we need evidence 
of God’s “signature” on the prophet’s work’, and that its key element is 
‘a violation of laws of nature’. Moreover, ‘the particular violation must 
be of a kind which the culture in which the violation occurred would 
recognize as God’s signature.’ For Christians, such a sign would be the 
Resurrection of Christ presented in the trustworthy reports of the New 
Testament.6
I  do not intend to evaluate here the claims of Christianity (or any 
other religion) to the authority in matters of divine revelation. The above 
analyses aimed only at showing that within the chain model it is possible 
to reconstruct how a given person may be justified in her belief about the 
access to divine revelation: this person may have good reasons to accept 
that a  given community  – through a  chain of testimonies  – reliably 
recounts the initiating event, which is of divine and universal character.
What would happen, however, when the mentioned person came 
across counter-reasons that oppose her belief? Those counter-reasons 
may be essentially reduced to the arguments supporting the thesis 
6 Cf. William L. Craig (2008: 333): ‘If Jesus rose from the dead, then his claims are 
vindicated and our Christian hope is sure; if Jesus did not rise, our faith is futile [...]’. Cf. 1 
Corinthians 15: 14-15.
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that  – as Linda Zagzebski writes (p.  202)  – reports on the so called 
initiating events ‘have probably been distorted in multiple ways during 
the course of many centuries’. But how do we know this? An adherent 
of this thesis might refer either to the scientific knowledge concerning 
the times when the initiating events allegedly occurred, or point to the 
discrepancies between the relevant testimonies. Let us observe, however, 
that scientific knowledge concerning the past largely relies on the records 
of human testimonies on it.7 Therefore, the testimony of a community 
actually competes not with the pure knowledge of the past, but with 
other testimonies. All is thus reduced to the competition of testimonies. 
Every one of us, in various situations of life, must evaluate on one’s own 
the reliability of the witnesses (sometimes competing) she encounters. 
This concerns also the religious sphere. It may happen that competing 
testimonies will induce an  adherent of a  given religion to abandon it 
or to convert to another one, or to correct her beliefs. However, it may 
also happen that those testimonies will be, in her opinion, too weak to 
change her beliefs, or that the testimony of her own community is more 
important to her. In the latter case she will continue believing in her 
original religion.8
III. THE EXPERIENCE MODEL
As Linda Zagzebski observes, the experience model  – as opposed to 
the chain model – ‘focuses on the recipient’s experience rather than the 
original experience [(CM1)]’ and reduces or ‘minimizes the function of 
tradition [(CM2)] in preserving the past intact’ (p. 194). In other words, 
in this model the nature of religious life does not consist in collective 
remembering of the remote initiating event, but amounts to the ‘firsthand 
experience of the divine’ (p. 194). This experience is shared by all the 
7 My analysis omits the knowledge interpreted in the light of the principle of 
naturalism (claiming that no supernatural events can take place), because making such 
an assumption one cannot envisage any possibility of revelation.
8 Let us remember that discrepancies between testimonies do not always concern 
essential issues. Besides, religious communities, especially those sharing common roots, 
dispute their interpretations of the message rather than its literal wording. It cannot also 
be excluded that the interpretations are complementary, and their multiplicity has been 
intended by the Revealing One who allows different ways of His revelation – according 
to the different cognitive capacities and spiritual needs of the revelation recipients. This 
issue merits a separate discussion, for instance, in the context of Zagzebski’s pertinent 
example of the disagreement concerning the Holy Trinity (pp. 213, 219-221).
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confessors, and not only by God’s chosen ones who, in the past, came 
into a direct contact with Him.
Then, how does it happen that individual religious persons, each 
of whom experiences God in the way limited ‘to the experience of one 
person’ (p. 202), form a community where a divine revelation acquires 
intersubjective validity? I  suppose that it is so, because the experience 
model incorporates the principles of the chain model, giving them new 
functions. If this is true, one can say that in the experience model:
(EM1) the initiating event does not consist so much in an exclusive 
and immediate experience of God by the few people He elected, as it 
provides inspiration for all future experiences of God by many more 
people; it may also be the norm that enables evaluation whether 
a given experience is a proper experience of God;
(EM2) the function of the multistage transmission of the result of 
the initiating event (experience) does not consist so much in its 
faithful preservation for future generations, as in enabling still new 
experiences similar to the original one;9
(EM3) the integrating intention of God (the Holy Spirit) unites all 
believers into one community, but not on the principle of collective 
remembering, but thanks to the common content of their experiences, 
which in some way imitate the original experience.
As we can see, the above – and I believe the optimum – interpretation of 
the experience model presents it as a reformulation and expansion of the 
chain model. In consequence, the presently discussed model inherits the 
advantages of the previous model. Moreover it has an advantage absent in 
the chain model: it is the possibility of subjects’ having additional reasons 
to accept a given religion, i.e. the subject can accept it not only on the 
basis of her conviction about the community’s reliability in transmitting 
the testimony of the original revelatory event, but also on the basis of 
her personal experience of the universal contents of this event. The fact 
of this experience being shared by many people in different times and 
places makes it impossible to raise an  objection of subjectivism and 
isolationism.
However, what will happen if a  subject of an  experience typical 
for a  given religion meets a  person with a  radically different religious 
9 As Zagzebski writes (p. 197): in Christianity ‘the transmission of the Gospels is the 
occasion by which the Holy Spirit produces faith as a first-hand relation to God’.
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experience? Then, like in the case of the competition of testimonies, 
the competition of experiences will occur. The difference between 
the two competitions consists in that, in the former case, the subject 
evaluates testimonies of others, while in the latter, she compares her own 
experiences to those of others. She can hardly be expected to give priority 
to someone else’s experience over her own, to which she has a privileged 
first-person access. With William P. Alston (1993: 274), she might say:
‘In the absence of any external reason for supposing that one of the 
competing [epistemic] practices [or experiences] is more accurate than 
my own, the only rational course for me is to sit tight with the practice of 
which I am a master and which serves me so well in guiding my activity 
in the world’ and in the religion.
Finishing the analysis of the experience model, I would like to add 
that that some Christians emphasize the importance of the mentioned 
experience so strongly that they feel exempt from the epistemic concern 
for reasons to confirm the community’s reliability in transmitting the 
testimony. I  consider this an  epistemic error. Without recognizing 
this reliability we cannot be justified in believing that our experiences 
are similar to the normative original experiences, and that the unity 
of different confessors’ experiences is neither illusory nor accidental. 
Moreover, extreme interpretations of the experience model lead to the 
change in the concept of revelation, whose content – as I have already 
said – significantly includes (or ought to include) the factors of historicity, 
communality and authority.
IV. THE HIGH POINT MODEL
The last model identifies divine revelation neither with the original 
experience (that is transmitted further), nor with subsequent 
experiences (inspired or regulated by the original one). In this model, 
revelation is identified (as Zagzebski puts it, p. 195, 197) with a certain 
‘way of understanding God’: a  given community acquired such a  way 
of understanding in the period that it recognized as ‘a high point’ in its 
history. This way of understanding God is expressed in a  collection  – 
considered as exemplary – of (oral and written) beliefs, stories, prayers, 
rites, practices, laws, commands, etc. We may say that  – according to 
the model in question – God reveals Himself not so much in individual 
events or experiences, as in a  self-understanding of a  given religious 
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community at the time when it was in a ‘state of perfection’ or mastery in 
the fulfilment of its activities.10
The merit of the high point model is its capacity, so that it can 
incorporate the previous models. Thus the mentioned exemplar of faith 
and practice of a given community may also include the story concerning 
the initiating event and ‘the belief that the chain [of its transmission] is 
basically accurate’ (p. 202) and unbroken. The exemplar may also include 
descriptions of paradigmatic religious experiences or other elements 
inspiring such experiences. Those factors are indeed very important for 
the life of religious communities; communities, however, transmit them 
in a wider context – in the context of once acquired, rich and compound 
wisdom.
An  additional advantage of the discussed model is that it allows 
a wider range of reasons available to the subject who wishes to justify 
her acceptance of a given religion. The subject may thus refer not only 
to the reliability of a given community in transmitting the testimony of 
the initiating event or to her own or someone else’s religious experiences, 
but also – or above all – to the cognitive and existential importance of 
the exemplar of beliefs and practices cultivated by the community. This is 
the case when the subject passes the conscientious judgment expressive 
of the following (or similar) content:
If I accept the exemplar of beliefs and practices proposed by a given 
religious community (instead of relying on another community or on 
myself only), my present and future convictions, feelings, experiences, 
actions, etc., will be coherently organized, justified or oriented, and 
‘will satisfy my future conscientious self-reflection’ (p. 199).
The above judgement may be based either on the recognition of 
the quasi-moral characteristics of the very community (such as its 
longevity; the number of people who accepted its teachings and were 
not disappointed; multifarious fruitfulness, e.g. charitable or culture-
creating, of its activities), or on the recognition of the epistemic value 
of beliefs it proclaims. In the latter case the judgment would be a kind 
of religious hypothesis, which – as the Polish logician Józef Bocheński 
10 As examples Zagzebski gives ‘the end of the biblical era’ for Judaism and ‘the 
Apostolic age’ (and early post-Apostolic tradition) for (Catholic) Christianity. A secular 
analogy is the artisanal mastery achieved in 16th century by Venetian glassmakers whose 
technique has been imitated in Italian glassmaking until today (see p. 196).
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suggested (1965: 148) – plays in the religious life a role similar to that of 
a scientific hypothesis in reductive sciences.11
The above-presented advantage of the high point model cannot – in 
my opinion  – undermine its double dependence on the chain model. 
The first dependence consists in that the exemplary collection of 
a  community’s beliefs (formed at its high point in the past) should 
necessarily, and not just facultatively, include a  reliable story on the 
initiating event as a particular God’s intervention, confirmed by special 
signs. Without His intervention, the emergence of this community as 
one inspired by God would be difficult to understand. Without it the 
community could offer its members or candidates nothing more than 
a system of human life wisdom – a system that would appear merely as 
one of the options on the market of competing worldviews.
The second dependence is conceptual. It is impossible to describe the 
essence of the high point model without using the principles of the chain 
model, as the former has also a trichotomous structure that results from 
the modification of the original model. The modification consists in that:
(HM1) the concept of the initiating event has been replaced by the 
concept of exemplary ‘way of understanding God’, formed at the time 
of a community’s flourishing;
(HM2) the multistage transmission, mentioned in (CM2), refers now 
to the transmission not of the initiating event itself, but of the whole 
‘way of understanding God’ as an exemplary system of beliefs and 
practices;
(HM3) the integrating (community-creating) intention of God 
is fulfilled not only by recalling the remote event, or producing or 
imitating similar experiences, but by applying the exemplar of faith 
11 Bocheński gave particular attention to two (fallible in their nature) ways of 
justifying religious beliefs: through the authority and through the religious hypothesis. 
In his theory of authority, he emphasized (among others) that every human authority 
is relativized to a given field, i.e. ‘every authority [except God] is only an authority in 
a limited class of sentences, not for all sentences’ (1965: 172). If so, one cannot suspect 
a cognitive dissonance in a person who accepts the authority of a given individual or 
community in some religious issues, and questions it in others. In turn the concept 
of the religious hypothesis is clarified by him in the following way: ‘at a  certain time 
of his life the subject begins to think that, if he does accept the BD [basic dogma] of 
a certain religion, then the whole of his experience will become organized and somewhat 
explained’ (1965: 149).
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and practice to varying conditions of every believer’s life – so that she 
can achieve ‘a way of living contact with God’ (pp. 197-198).
Let us observe that the above presentation of the high point model – as 
a structure based on (CM1)-(CM3) structure – emphasizes the necessary 
components of revelation mentioned earlier: historicity, communality 
and indispensable authority. However, the specific principles (HM1)-
(HM3) refer to different authorities or different layers of one authority: 
the authority of God, the authority of the exemplar of faith and of the 
experience of God (together with the authority of the initiating event 
transmission and the authority of its participants), the authority of 
the whole community, and the authority of institutions to which the 
‘responsibility for the authenticity [and updating] of tradition’ (p. 198) 
has been ascribed. Examining the epistemic value of the authority 
conceived of in this way, it is necessary to consider more factors than in 
the case of less comprehensive models. All this renders the question of 
evaluating the revelatory claims, made by different religions, particularly 
complicated.
CONCLUSION
My analyses confirm Linda Zagzebski’s belief that in looking for 
an adequate model of revelation, we need to go beyond the traditional 
chain model, as well as the model that attaches too much attention to 
experience. The high point model (or – as I would prefer to call it – the 
exemplary wisdom model) that she reconstructs actually seems to 
provide the most accurate description of the functioning of religion. 
Its greatest advantage is a  very capacious understanding of revelation 
and authority. This capacity translates into a very wide range of reasons 
available to a subject to justify her choice of a certain religion (and also 
a wide range of problems she must consider in this context). It should 
be remembered, however, that the above model depends on the chain 
model in a significant way. In my opinion, the main epistemic concern 
of a person assessing the value of a given religion usually is – and should 
be – whether a given community speaks about facts and whether those 
facts consisted in the (continually updated) action of God.
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